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Abstract 
‘Climate geoengineering’ is becoming an increasingly prominent focus for global discussion and 
action. Yet, in academic, policy and wider political discourse, the frequent shorthand term 
‘geoengineering’ is routinely used in very broad, ambiguous and multivalent ways.  This study aims 
to contribute to understandings of these divergent current framings of ‘geoengineering’ and their 
implications. It asks not only about disparate understandings of geoengineering itself, but also what 
these reveal about deeper political dynamics around climate change, science and technology. To this 
end, the paper applies Q methodology to analyse geoengineering as a subjective discursive construct, 
the bounds of which are continually negotiated and contested.  35 participants from a variety of 
political and institutional backgrounds in the UK, US, Canada and Japan undertook a ‘Q sort’ of 48 
statements about geoengineering between December 2012 and February 2013.  Four distinctive 
framings emerged from this analysis, labelled: ‘At the very least we need more research’; ‘We are 
the planetary maintenance engineers’; ‘Geoengineering is a political project’; and ‘Let’s focus on 
Carbon.’  Results indicate a strong polarity around divergently-construed pros and cons of 
geoengineering as a whole – underscoring the political salience of this term. But additional axes of 
difference suggest a more nuanced picture than straightforward pro/anti positioning.  The ambiguity 
of the term is argued to offer interpretive flexibility for articulating diverse interests within and 
across contending framings. The paper questions whether increasing terminological precision will 
necessarily facilitate greater clarity in resulting multivalent governance discussions and public 
engagement. It argues that the merits of any given form of precision and their policy implications 
will depend on particular framings. Much ambiguity in this area may thus be irreducible, with the 
challenges lying perhaps less in the ordering of discourse and more in reconciling the wider material 
political pluralities that this suggests. 
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Abstract 3 
‘Climate geoengineering’ is becoming an increasingly prominent focus for global discussion and action. Yet, 4 
in academic, policy and wider political discourse, the frequent shorthand term ‘geoengineering’ is routinely 5 
used in very broad, ambiguous and multivalent ways.  This study aims to contribute to understandings of 6 
these divergent current framings of ‘geoengineering’ and their implications. It asks not only about disparate 7 
understandings of geoengineering itself, but also what these reveal about deeper political dynamics around 8 
climate change, science and technology. To this end, the paper applies Q methodology to analyse 9 
geoengineering as a subjective discursive construct, the bounds of which are continually negotiated and 10 
contested.  35 participants from a variety of political and institutional backgrounds in the UK, US, Canada 11 
and Japan undertook a ‘Q sort’ of 48 statements about geoengineering between December 2012 and 12 
February 2013.  Four distinctive framings emerged from this analysis, labelled: ‘At the very least we need 13 
more research’; ‘We are the planetary maintenance engineers’; ‘Geoengineering is a political project’; and 14 
‘Let’s focus on Carbon.’  Results indicate a strong polarity around divergently-construed pros and cons of 15 
geoengineering as a whole – underscoring the political salience of this term. But additional axes of difference 16 
suggest a more nuanced picture than straightforward pro/anti positioning.  The ambiguity of the term is 17 
argued to offer interpretive flexibility for articulating diverse interests within and across contending framings. 18 
The paper questions whether increasing terminological precision will necessarily facilitate greater clarity in 19 
resulting multivalent governance discussions and public engagement. It argues that the merits of any given 20 
form of precision and their policy implications will depend on particular framings. Much ambiguity in this 21 
area may thus be irreducible, with the challenges lying perhaps less in the ordering of discourse and more in 22 
reconciling the wider material political pluralities that this suggests.  23 
1 Introduction 24 
Concepts of ‘climate geoengineering’ implicate a diverse array of technologies, in the broadest sense of this 25 
term (Jasanoff 1995) – including radically new forms of social practice, institutional culture and political 26 
relation, as much as potentially enormous innovations in artefacts and worldwide infrastructures. Commonly 27 
referred to as ‘geoengineering’, these include technologies variously aiming at ‘solar radiation management’ 28 
(such as stratospheric aerosol injection and marine cloud brightening), and  those aiming at ‘carbon dioxide 29 
removal’ (such as ocean iron fertilization, or direct air capture) (Shepherd et al. 2009). Although the term 30 
geoengineering has become increasingly prominent in discussions of these approaches in scientific, policy, 31 
and civil society circles, there is evidence of a growing sense that the label itself may be so broad and 32 
ambiguous as to be unhelpful, or even incoherent.  Thus the recent report from the IPCC ‘expert meeting on 33 
geoengineering’  draws attention to what it holds to be a ‘fuzzy’ boundary between geoengineering and 34 
other approaches to dealing with climate change, and suggests that ‘because of the longstanding ambiguity 35 
surrounding the term geoengineering … the individual methods discussed might be referred to more 36 
specifically’ (Edenhofer et al. 2012, p.3). This refrain about the need to look at different technologies and 37 
approaches separately runs through many other reports on geoengineering, and yet many of them (like the 38 
IPCC report) retain the word geoengineering in their titles (Shepherd et al. 2009; GAO 2010). In one such 39 
report by the US think tank, the Bipartisan Policy Centre (Long et al. 2011), debates around whether the 40 
term geoengineering ‘was too imprecise…[or] too controversial’ (Sarewitz 2011, p.7), actually resulted in the 41 
appearance of the additional (equally imprecise) term ‘climate remediation’ being used alongside 42 
geoengineering in the title. 43 
Given the widespread awareness of the ambiguity of the term, and the difficulties this poses for meaningful 44 
(or accountable) governance interventions, is it the case that the term geoengineering can be said to have 45 
simply outgrown its usefulness?  Or is it that, as has been argued to be the case for terms such as 46 
‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable development’ (Baker et al. 1997) it is the very ambiguity of the terms that 47 
provides the ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Pinch & Bijker 1984) enabling them to serve as ‘boundary objects’ 48 
(Gieryn 1983) around which contending actors can co-ordinate (Stirling 2006). In this latter event, ostensibly 49 
negative properties of ‘ambiguity’ (unclear or uncertain meaning) and ‘multivalence’ (clearly contending 50 
meanings) may – provided other conditions are also satisfied – instead emerge (at least under some views) 51 
as potentially more positive. That an otherwise contending diversity of actors may in certain moments find 52 
such qualities ‘useful’ may lend such ambiguous and multivalent terms a surprising degree of resilience.  53 
Rather than seeing either ambiguity or multivalence as ‘a linguistic veil which can be lifted to reveal the truth’ 54 
(Rydin 1999, p.468), and attempting to remove this by carrying out our own ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn, 1983) 55 
to define a sub-set of technologies or approaches as our object of study, a starting point is to adopt a more 56 
neutral position with respect to these properties.   This study is thus distinct from previous work on frames 57 
and framing of geoengineering, much of which starts by offering a definition of geoengineering as the object 58 
of study (Sikka 2012a; Luokkanen et al. 2013; Huttunen & Hilden 2012; Scholte et al. 2013; Nerlich & Jaspal 59 
2012). Rather than treating geoengineering a priori as an object, a ‘novel controversial technology’ 60 
(Luokkanen et al. 2013) – or  even a set of technologies about which there exists an array of sometimes 61 
conflicting opinions, or for which there is support or opposition – this study treats geoengineering as a 62 
discursive phenomenon, the bounds of which are continually being negotiated.  This is in line with insights in 63 
much recent policy analysis, which draws attention to the fact that environmental conflict should not be 64 
understood as ‘a conflict over a pre-defined unequivocal problem with competing actors pro and con,’ but 65 
seen rather as ‘a complex and continuous struggle over the definition and meaning of the environmental 66 
problem itself’ (Hajer 1997, p.14). Focusing analytical attention on the inherently ambiguous, 67 
undifferentiated category  ‘geoengineering’ (a term that has been referred to as a ‘quasi-stable meta-label’ 68 
(Porter & Hulme 2013, p.3)), is argued to be the best way to identify (rather than impose) the most 69 
significant axes for distinction, as these relate to key differences in divergent perspectives.   70 
Rather than working to remove ambiguity and multivalence from the term geoengineering, then, this study 71 
shifts the focus to that of exploring the kinds of work that this term performs. Whether in spite, or because 72 
of, associated ambiguities and multivalence, this discursive function forms an important object of policy 73 
analysis in its own right – with potentially deeper and broader material political implications.  The result is a 74 
perspective on the kinds of wider politics in play around contemporary debates concerning the role of 75 
knowledge and innovation under climate change.  76 
1.1 Framing geoengineering 77 
There exists a small but growing body of academic literature examining discourses and framing of 78 
geoengineering. This includes work focused on media framings (Porter & Hulme 2013; Scholte et al. 2013; 79 
Luokkanen et al. 2013); framings in the academic literature (Bellamy et al. 2012; Huttunen & Hilden 2012); 80 
framings within public discourse (Macnaghten & Szerszynski 2013);  the use of metaphor (Nerlich & Jaspal 81 
2012), and within particular influential texts (Gardiner 2011).  A number of common themes have emerged 82 
in this work, for example the importance of ‘climate emergency’ as a framing device (Nerlich & Jaspal 2012; 83 
Sikka 2012b; Gardiner 2013). But there also arise a diversity of findings regarding the relative openness or 84 
otherwise of the discourse around geoengineering, or the relative importance of strategic framing to the 85 
issue.  Given that the term is arguably still unfamiliar to many people, some have argued that the ‘first 86 
impression, frame, and narrative has yet to be set’ (Leiserowitz 2010, cited by Buck 2013), or that there is a 87 
need for more active and strategic framing of the issue by scientists in particular ways (Buck 2013).  Others 88 
argue that the ways appraisals of geoengineering options have been carried out to date, provide evidence of 89 
a premature ‘closing down’ around particular ‘sets of values and assumptions with respect to the 90 
instrumental framing effects of contexts, methods and criteria and options’ (Bellamy et al. 2012, p.28). In 91 
similar vein, others cite evidence from analysis of the metaphors used to describe geoengineering as 92 
indicative of ‘restrictions in the interpretative flexibility’ of the term (Luokkanen et al. 2013).  Sikka takes a 93 
particularly strong view of the strategic nature of the framing of geoengineering to date, arguing that ‘special 94 
interests, including private corporations, conservative think tanks and scientists affiliated with both have 95 
drawn on a variety of discursive frames to limit, shape and mould the current debate surrounding 96 
geoengineering’ (Sikka 2012a, p.173). Conversely others have drawn evidence from an analysis of the 97 
changing frames of geoengineering apparent in English speaking newspapers in recent years, to argue that 98 
there is evidence of a progressive ‘opening up’ (Stirling 2008) of the debate around geoengineering (Scholte 99 
et al. 2013). 100 
This study falls broadly under the description of a frame-reflective analysis, as outlined by Schon and Rein 101 
(Schön & Rein 1995). As such, it complements and builds upon the corpus of work on framing of 102 
geoengineering by bringing a distinctive focus on the ambiguity and multivalence of the term, as outlined 103 
above.  Within this study, frames are understood as ‘schemata of interpretation’ (Goffman 1974, p.21), or 104 
narratives of understanding that ‘help to render events meaningful and thereby function to organize 105 
experience and guide action’ (Benford & Snow 2000, p.614). Through selectively emphasizing certain facets 106 
of a given issue over others, and linking interpretation with action, frames in and of themselves can be 107 
understood to perform particular functions (c.f. Entman 2004).  Crucially, frames have both ontological and 108 
normative dimensions in that they ‘link causal accounts of policy problems to particular proposals for action, 109 
and so link accounts of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (Rein and Schon cited in Fischer and Forester 1993, p. 11). Hoppe 110 
(1999) emphasises that frames are necessary for judgement and action, acting as ‘a sort of mental grappling 111 
hook’ (p.207) to enable people to make sense of and act on a given situation. By thus deeply conditioning 112 
understandings of the fundamental entities, uncertainties, interests and values in play, the significance of 113 
these dynamics can extend far beyond discourse alone. By variously driving and shaping actors’ 114 
appreciations of the implications of their own commitments and those of others, as well as the broader 115 
possibilities and what may be at stake, these framings also shape ontologies of action. It is in such ways, that 116 
these discursive phenomena can hold powerful material implications for the exercise of social, political and 117 
economic agency towards the structuring of relations and deployment of various kinds of resource (Lukes 118 
2004; Gramsci 1971; Foucault 2002; Bourdieu 1984).  119 
2 Material and methods 120 
This study used Q methodology, a form of discourse analysis with roots in social psychology (Stephenson 121 
1953), to examine framings of geoengineering.  Q is an intensive, ‘small n’ methodology in which a limited 122 
number of purposively selected participants (usually between 20 – 40 people), rank order a selection of 123 
subjective statements about the topic of interest.  These ‘Q sorts’ are then compared with one another, and 124 
groups of similarly performed sorts are revealed using factor analysis. These clusters of sorts represent 125 
shared framings of the topic of interest.   The methodology proceeds in three stages: 1. A selection of 126 
statements reflecting the diversity of opinions about the subject of interest is collected (the concourse), and 127 
a sub-set of these are selected (the Q sample) in order to be administered to participants; 2. participants are 128 
selected and carry out the Q sorting process; 3. results are statistically analysed, and the resulting patterns 129 
are interpreted with the aid of comments made by participants. 130 
2.1 Building the concourse and selecting the Q sample 131 
Subjective statements about the topic of geoengineering were sought from a diverse range of sources, 132 
including: academic papers, government policy documents, NGO reports, scientific and popular news media 133 
sources, television and radio interviews, blog posts and comments on online news sites.  The aim of 134 
statement selection was to gather together as comprehensive as possible a selection of opinions about 135 
geoengineering. The final concourse consisted of 322 statements, after which it was decided that the 136 
addition of further statements did not add to the diversity of opinions present, and that a ‘saturation point’ 137 
(Eden et al. 2005) had been reached.  To narrow down the concourse to the sample of statements to be 138 
presented to participants (the ‘Q sample’), a structured approach was adopted whereby statements were 139 
categorised into a number of themes that were observed in the concourse as a whole.  These were: 1) 140 
context (the nature of ‘the problem’); 2) definitions and characteristics of geoengineering; 3) appraisals of 141 
geoengineering; 4) the relationship between science/research and deployment; and 5) governance concerns.  142 
Approximately equal numbers of statements from each category were sought, with the aim that each would 143 
capture a particular dimension of the issue around which opinion might be divided.   In line with a rule of 144 
thumb that suggests a Q sample size of between 20 – 60 statements (Webler et al. 2009, p.15), the final 145 
sample consisted of 48 statements.  A pilot was carried out with 7 individuals (colleagues from the 146 
Universities of Sussex, UCL, Oxford and the University of Waterloo, Canada, who were not subsequently 147 
involved as participants in the study), in order to test the clarity of the statements, the comprehensiveness 148 
of the themes and topics covered by the statement sample, and the ease with which it was possible to sort 149 
them.  Following the pilot, a number of statements were removed because they were felt to be confusing or 150 
to duplicate existing themes in the sample, others were paraphrased for greater clarity, and a number of 151 
additional statements were added to cover themes that were felt by pilot participants to be missing.  For 152 
example the statement: ‘Decisions based on knowledge are better than those based on ignorance, and public 153 
policy on geoengineering should be based on the best evidence we can get,’  was removed from the final 154 
sample as it was felt to duplicate statement 33 (‘Government support for geoengineering research is 155 
important, because good policy decisions depend on good science’). Statement 46 (‘It’s not a question of if 156 
but when humanity will be compelled to use geoengineering’) was suggested by a pilot participant in order to 157 
cover the theme of inevitability that was felt to be missing from the existing sample. The final set of 48 158 
statements is listed in Table 2. 159 
2.2 Selecting participants and carrying out the Q sorts 160 
The aim of participant selection was not to try ‘representatively’ to elicit the views of some imagined wider 161 
publics as such (Warner 2010; Dewey 1927; O’Neill 2001). Rather, participants were selected on the basis 162 
that it was felt that they had the potential to reveal something interesting about the ways in which debates 163 
around geoengineering are structured and the existing frames and framing strategies that are being 164 
employed. The priority here was exploring the hermeneutic degrees of freedom of a multidimensional 165 
discursive constellation (Feenberg 2010), rather than establishing a set of notionally ‘representative’ centres 166 
of gravity.  Based on an initial review of the academic and non-academic literature on the topic, a list of 167 
participants was drawn up to encompass as diverse as possible a range of people making statements about 168 
geoengineering from different disciplinary backgrounds, sectors, nationalities and genders.   Participants in 169 
geoengineering discourse were identified as being associated with a number of broad ‘sectors’, identified as: 170 
academia (broadly divided into natural/physical sciences and social sciences/ humanities), industry, 171 
government, NGO’s/civil society, and the media.  In order to ensure diversity in the sample, at least two 172 
individuals from each of these sectors were selected.  It has been previously observed that the discourse 173 
around geoengineering is dominated by ‘a very small elite of Caucasian male scientists’ (Hulme 2012), and 174 
since the aim of this study was to examine extant framings it was expected that this group would 175 
predominate in the participant group.  However, attempts were also made to increase the gender diversity, 176 
and number of nationalities involved in the sample through efforts to actively seek out female voices in the 177 
geoengineering debates, and through circulating the invitation to participate as widely as possible via the 178 
internet, to the geoengineering Google list (an online forum for discussion on geoengineering: 179 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/geoengineering), Geoengineering Net Forum (a Japanese 180 
discussion forum on geoengineering: http://geoeng.brs.nihon-u.ac.jp/) and the African Technology Policy 181 
Studies Network.  In order to maximise the diversity of opinions, a snowballing approach was also adopted, 182 
whereby participants were asked to identify other possible recruits with opinions that might differ from their 183 
own.  In order to enhance the reflexivity and transparency of the project to which this research contributes 184 
(the Climate Geoengineering Governance Project), individuals associated with the wider project were also 185 
invited to participate.  Following good practice guidelines in scholarship on Q methodology (Robbins & 186 
Krueger 2000; Swedeen 2006), the lead author also carried out a Q sort.   These sorts can be distinguished in 187 
the results by the letters CGG. 188 
Participants were asked to sort the statements into a grid along a scale from +4 (most like their point of view) 189 
to -4 (least like their point of view). As is common in Q studies, the grid had a pyramidal or ‘quasi-normal’ 190 
shape, which limited the number of statements that could be placed in each category (See Figure 1).  191 
Although the imposition of this distribution shape is not necessary for the technique to work (Brown 1971; 192 
Burt 1972; Barry & Proops 1999), it is considered good practice as it encourages the participants to consider 193 
the relative placement of the statements more carefully and hence to reveal their preferences more 194 
thoroughly (Webler et al. 2009).   195 
The majority of sorts were carried out during face-to-face interviews.  In addition, in order to maximise the 196 
diversity of the participant group and facilitate international participation, there was an option for 197 
participants to take part via an online interface using the Q-Assessor software (http://q-assessor.com), a tool 198 
specifically designed for online Q studies.  The use of a combination of face-to-face Q sorts and online sorts 199 
has precedents in the literature on Q method (e.g. Gruber 2011) and is supported by empirical work which 200 
has shown there to be no apparent difference in the reliability or validity of face-to-face sorts and those 201 
carried out remotely by mail (Van Tubergen & Olins 1979); between paper sorts and online sorts in general 202 
(Hogan 2010); and between paper sorts and the specific online sorting program we applied in this study, Q-203 
Assessor (Reber et al. 2000). 204 
2.3 Statistical analysis and interpretation 205 
Q sorts were analysed with the freely available software PQMethod (Schmolck 2002).   Each sort was 206 
correlated with every other sort, and a correlation matrix was generated. Principal components analysis was 207 
then used to identify clusters of similarly performed Q sorts, and the resulting factors were rotated using a 208 
varimax rotation that aimed to find the simplest structure in the data and to explain the greatest amount of 209 
variance.   It is important to bear in mind that there is not just one objectively ‘correct’ or ‘mathematically 210 
superior’ solution regarding the number of factors that emerge from a Q study (Watts & Stenner 2005, p.80).  211 
Rather, although the data itself is ‘fixed’ in the sense that the correlation scores between individual Q sorts 212 
do not change, there could be many vantage points from which to view and describe the similarities and 213 
differences between views, that are largely dependent on what one is interested in (for example, whether 214 
one is interested particularly in revealing minority views, or examining more dominant discourses). In this 215 
study a solution was sought that maximised the simplicity, clarity, distinctness and stability of the emerging 216 
framings (Webler et al. 2009, p.31), and ensured that at least 2 individual Q sorts correlated uniquely with 217 
each factor (cf. Brown, 1980 p. 293). Correlations between an individual’s Q sort and a given factor were 218 
deemed as being statistically significant at the p<0.01 level, if they exceeded a factor loading of  +/-0.38, 219 
based on the relation:  2.58/√n), where n = the number of statements in the Q sample: 2.58/ √48 = 0.3723 220 
(Brown 1980). Sorts that were significantly correlated with a factor (i.e. those that load at +/- 0.38 for that 221 
factor) were considered indicative of that view, and the weighted average of those sorts were used to 222 
calculate an idealised sorting pattern for that factor along the original response scale (-4 to +4). Narrative 223 
descriptions of each factor were drafted by examining these idealised sorting patterns and analysing the 224 
interview comments made by those people whose sorts were significantly correlated with that factor.  Draft 225 
descriptions of these factor narratives were sent to all participants, who were asked to comment on whether 226 
they felt that their views had been appropriately interpreted. These comments were used to test the validity 227 
of the views described. 228 
 229 
[Insert Figure 1: The distribution shape onto which participants were asked to sort the statements in the Q 230 
sample.] 231 
 232 
3 Results 233 
Thirty-five diverse participants carried out a Q sort, thirteen of whom carried out the sort online. Twenty-234 
seven of the participants were male and eight female. Twenty-seven of the participants were from the UK,  235 
four were from the U.S., two from Canada, and two from Japan. The sectors with which participants were 236 
associated are given in Table 1.  With participant permission, the full list of participants and their 237 
institutional affiliations (where applicable) is given in the appendix.  Based on the criteria listed in section 2.3, 238 
three factors emerged from the analysis.  One of these was a ‘bipolar’ factor (certain individuals’ sorts were 239 
highly positively correlated with this factor, while others were highly negatively correlated), indicating the 240 
presence of two groups of people who sorted the statements in more or less opposite ways.  Following 241 
standard practice in Q studies (Brown 1980), the bipolar factor was split into two separate factors, which 242 
resulted in a final solution consisting of four factors. The idealised sorting pattern for each factor is given in 243 
Table 2.  The degree to which each participant’s sort correlated with each factor described is given in Table 3. 244 
Participants who carried out a web-based sort are distinguished in Table 3. by the letter W, while individuals 245 
associated with the Climate Geoengineering Governance project, including the lead author, are distinguished 246 
by the letters CGG.  The degree of correlation between factors is given in Table 4.  Narrative descriptions of 247 
the four factors follow.  248 
 249 
[Insert Table 1: Sectors with which participants were associated (for details see appendix)] 250 
 251 
[Insert Table 2:  Statements sorted by participants, and the idealised sorting pattern (from -4 to +4) for each 252 
factor] 253 
 254 
[Insert Table 3: Degree to which each participant’s sort correlated with each factor] 255 
 256 
[Insert Table 4: Correlations between factors] 257 
  258 
3.1 Narrative descriptions of the factors/framings 259 
The factors represent different framings of geoengineering, and were assigned names drawn from 260 
statements that were ranked highly for that factor. The numbers in square brackets within the text refer to 261 
the statement upon which the interpretation is based (see Table 2). It will be noted (in Table 3) that a 262 
number of individuals’ Q sorts correlated with more than one factor which suggests that there is not 263 
necessarily radical discontinuity across framings (c.f. Dryzek & Berejikian 1993), and that many individuals 264 
have access to, and may move between discourses or framings (c.f. Collins & Yearley 1992).  265 
This kind of dynamic is common in Q  studies which examine distributed societal, rather than individual 266 
psychological, phenomena (Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers 1990). In other words, there is no 267 
presumption of immutable one-to-one matches between individual positions and particular framings. Nor is 268 
there any prior assumption that framings are immutable or that any given individual will engage with only 269 
one in any given context. This enables the method to identify a relatively high number of individuals whose 270 
views in different ways span between what are otherwise established to be quite discretely stabilised 271 
discourses. Again, this might be interpreted as illustrative of the fundamentally ambiguous nature of the 272 
term geoengineering. It might also perhaps be suggestive that (as described below), the discursive landscape 273 
is characterised by a high degree of ambivalence around and between contrasting stabilised framings. 274 
Individuals are thus evidently not only contending with the many ambiguities in play, but actively struggling 275 
to formulate opinions incorporating contradictory normative positions.  Such individual ambivalence 276 
provides a potentially interesting illustration of the distinction drawn at the outset between the ambiguity 277 
and multivalence of the geoengineering discourse as a whole. A consequence of this, however, is that 278 
although the framings will be described below as discrete in order to facilitate an exploration of some of the 279 
different tensions within and between them, it should be remembered that each is also profoundly 280 
interlinked with others by means of these continuously actively-mediated  discursive relations.  281 
 282 
3.1.1 Factor 1:  “At the very least we need more research”  283 
Ten participants’ sorts were correlated significantly with this factor, including six individuals from academic 284 
(natural/physical science) backgrounds, one journalist, one government employee, one non-governmental 285 
organisation professional, and an individual from an industrial background.  The present authors summarise 286 
this framing as follows: 287 
Action on climate change is clearly urgent [39], but arguments that frame the need for geoengineering in 288 
terms of an emergency are unhelpful and counterproductive [48].  Geoengineering is certainly not the most 289 
revolutionary new idea in climate policy [14], however we shouldn’t rule any options out, and at the very 290 
least we need more research in this area to understand what approaches won’t work and should be avoided 291 
at all costs [12]. Research is the only way to determine the potential impacts of different technologies, and 292 
we have now achieved the level of scientific sophistication to make research in this area worthwhile [5, 17].  293 
Research is clearly distinct from deployment, and if carried out in a responsible manner, should not be overly 294 
controversial [16]. Indeed, if responsible parties don’t carry out research, it will be done by less responsible 295 
parties [37].  Furthermore, the technical community has a responsibility to explore back-up strategies for 296 
dealing with possible future climate emergences [19].  Now is the time for a serious societal conversation 297 
about if and how we want to develop these different technologies [38], and public involvement in choices 298 
about directions of research and development in this area are crucial [13, 41]. Regulation of research is 299 
important, but should be undertaken carefully, as there is a risk that hastily developed regulation might be 300 
counter-productive and stifle innovation and scientific freedom [4]. Given the variety of different research 301 
activities that might take place, a moratorium on all activities outside the laboratory doesn’t make sense [25, 302 
47]. Although the deployment of geoengineering is by no means inevitable [46], and we already have all the 303 
technology we need to reduce emissions [45], some kinds of geoengineering will probably be a necessary part 304 
of any solution [39].  Geoengineering technologies that are likely to be more ethically preferable are 305 
‘encapsulated technologies’ such as air capture, rather than non-encapsulated techniques such as 306 
stratospheric aerosols or iron fertilization [28].  Commercial involvement in geoengineering might be helpful 307 
[27], but we should probably be wary of claims of technologies to provide win-win solutions allowing 308 
economic growth and mitigation to proceed hand in hand [23]. 309 
 310 
3.1.2 Factor 2:  “We are the planetary maintenance engineers”  311 
Two participants’ sorts were correlated significantly with this factor, both of whom were associated with 312 
non-governmental organisations.  The framing has been summarised as follows: 313 
We are currently in an unprecedented planetary emergency brought about by climate change [4], immediate 314 
action is urgent [32], and it is likely to be only a question of time before humanity is compelled to use 315 
geoengineering [46].  Geoengineering is an important part of the solution to climate change [35, 40], hence, 316 
research on geoengineering is both crucial and worthwhile [5, 17], and should be supported by governments 317 
as the best basis for sound policy making [33]. Humans have demonstrated their ability to build functioning 318 
complex control systems [30], and now need to apply that knowledge to the task of planetary maintenance 319 
engineering that (like it or not) now falls upon us [6]. Given the dire state of the climate, neither research nor 320 
deployment of geoengineering should be overly controversial [16]. Although there might be some risk 321 
associated with research, not carrying out research given what we know about climate change would be 322 
riskier [3].  Only through research can we learn what technologies might be helpful, and conversely which 323 
shouldn’t be deployed [12].  Investment in geoengineering research isn’t likely to have a significantly negative 324 
impact on policies towards mitigation and adaptation, especially when one considers the dire state that 325 
mitigation policies are in already [36], and while the governance of geoengineering brings particular 326 
challenges, these are likely to be less difficult to overcome than the challenges of transforming the global 327 
energy system [42], which so far appears to have failed. Indeed geoengineering has the potential to 328 
revolutionise climate policy [14], opening-up possibilities for economic growth and climate change mitigation 329 
to proceed hand in hand [23].  We should not be too hasty in pursuing regulation, which might be stifling to 330 
innovation and research [4]. A ban on geoengineering would just be counterproductive [25], likely resulting in 331 
research being carried out in secrecy or by less responsible parties [34, 47].  Those carrying out research are 332 
motivated by a desire to find solutions to the climate change problem, and for developing ‘back-up’ 333 
strategies for dealing with a possible future climate emergency [19], rather than any other motivation [8, 7]. 334 
Given the urgency of the problem, commercial involvement in geoengineering might be positive in terms of 335 
mobilizing innovation and capital investment, possibly increasing the speed with which these technologies 336 
could be developed [27].  337 
 338 
3.1.3 Factor 3: “Geoengineering is a political strategy”  339 
Five participants’ sorts were significantly correlated with this factor, including 3 individuals from academic 340 
(social science/ humanities) backgrounds, one journalist and one individual associated with a non-341 
governmental organisation.  This framing has been summarised as follows: 342 
Geoengineering won’t solve climate change, but is likely to cause unpredictable and irreversible damage to 343 
the planet [35]. Attempts to control the climate through geoengineering are neither feasible [30], nor 344 
inevitable [46], and would likely lead humanity to a dystopian future in which we would find ourselves 345 
trapped by the consequences of our hubristic actions [21]. Geoengineering proposals stem from the same 346 
mind set of attempting to control nature that got us into the environmental mess we are in today [1], and are 347 
built on the dangerous illusion that complex social problems can be solved with technology [9].  The idea that 348 
all of the proposed technologies can be defined as geoengineering because their stated intent is to deal with 349 
climate change, is misleading [22]. More than as a set of technologies defined by a stated shared intent, 350 
geoengineering can be thought of as a political strategy [24] that serves the interests of the status quo. The 351 
commercial interest in some of these technologies only serves to highlight this, and if we were really serious 352 
that geoengineering was about ‘saving the planet’ we wouldn’t leave such a task to business [27].  We have 353 
all the technologies we need to mitigate carbon emissions effectively; it’s just a question of using them [45]. 354 
More research into new technologies isn’t the most crucial thing [12]; indeed, the risks of doing research 355 
(including the risk of strategic military applications of these technologies [8]) may well outweigh the benefits 356 
[3]. It isn’t possible to separate out research from deployment in any straightforward way, and both should 357 
be considered controversial [16]: carrying out research, especially field trials, is the first step toward 358 
deployment, and drawing distinctions between different types of field test only serves to obscure this fact 359 
[47].  Since full-scale trials are unethical and small-scale trials can’t produce useful data in the noise of global 360 
weather [5], it is common sense to institute a moratorium on all testing activities outside the laboratory [25]. 361 
The argument that ‘someone somewhere will do it, so it might as well be us’ [37] is not acceptable, nor are 362 
arguments stemming from claims of present day [48] or hypothetical future emergencies [12]. The 363 
governance challenges of controlling the global climate through geoengineering would likely be more 364 
complex and difficult to overcome than those of transforming the global energy system [42], and given the 365 
undemocratic and risky nature of proposals for geoengineering, we shouldn’t be going down this path [21]. 366 
Publics need to be engaged meaningfully in decisions about research [13], and ultimately have control over 367 
which (if any) of these technologies are to be pursued [41]. However, much talk of governance seems to see 368 
deployment as inevitable, and is hence a purely instrumental exercise for smoothing this process, rather than 369 
allowing genuine dissent to emerge [26].   370 
 371 
3.1.4 Factor 4: “Let’s focus on carbon”  372 
Four participants’ sorts were significantly correlated with this factor, including two individuals from industrial 373 
backgrounds, and two individuals from academic backgrounds (one social scientist, one natural scientist).  374 
The framing has been summarised as follows: 375 
Action on climate change is urgent [32], and is likely to require the development and deployment of new 376 
technologies [45], including some that might be labelled as geoengineering [39].  However, the definition of 377 
geoengineering is slippery and after realising that our actions en masse affect the climate, anything we do to 378 
address it (including nothing) might be considered geoengineering [18].  Although ambiguous, the concept of 379 
geoengineering might be useful as a political strategy to help open up the solution space available to us for 380 
dealing with climate change [24].  There is nothing wrong with a technological fix per se [40, 20], but it’s 381 
important to remember that technology alone will not ‘solve’ the climate change problem [35]. It is 382 
important to ensure that the direction of development of these technologies is the subject of public 383 
deliberation and control [41], so that, appropriately managed, Geoengineering does not have to be 384 
fundamentally undemocratic [2]. We clearly need research into new technologies, if only to be able to rule 385 
out those that shouldn’t be deployed [12], but some research is more morally acceptable [31] than others, 386 
and the argument that ‘someone will do it so it might as well be someone responsible’ (i.e. us) is problematic 387 
[37].  Research cannot be neatly separated from deployment, and thus it is difficult to defend the idea that 388 
only deployment should be controversial [16]. For this reason publics should be engaged ‘upstream’ in the 389 
direction of research in this area [13]. The inherent complexities of the climate system limit the human ability 390 
to predict and judge cause and effects of interventions [17].  This complexity, coupled with human fallibility, 391 
means that attempts to control the climate system are likely to fail [30].  Hence we should focus our energies 392 
on removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere [43] (an endeavour in which commercial involvement 393 
might be helpful [27]), so that with the right technological and social changes, a carbon neutral future for 394 
humanity can be achieved [11], and mitigation and continuing economic activity can take place [23].  395 
 396 
4 Discussion 397 
For reasons already discussed, no claim is made that the four framings described above, constitute any kind 398 
of comprehensive, authoritative or final set of framings.  As in any study of discourse (whether 399 
acknowledged or not), these might rather be thought of as stylised indications that will hopefully be of 400 
heuristic utility in offering ‘tools to think with’ in processes of further enquiry (c.f. Brand & Fischer 2012). 401 
This discussion will draw out some of the tensions between and within the different framings and examining 402 
how concepts of control, research, novelty and interests all feature within and constitute the different 403 
framings of geoengineering.  In the following discussion quotes are given anonymously in order to preserve 404 
participant anonymity, but where the participant in question is associated with the Climate Geoengineering 405 
Governance project, the quote is followed by the letters CGG.  Quotes taken from online participants are 406 
distinguished by the letter W. 407 
Given the existence of campaigns both for and against geoengineering in general (see for example the work 408 
of the Arctic Methane Emergency Group, and the Hands Off Mother Earth campaign), one might expect to 409 
find that opinion around geoengineering is highly polarised. The emergence of a bipolar factor (split into 410 
Factors 2 and 3), indicating highly opposed views, is therefore perhaps unsurprising. The prominence of this 411 
axis also confirms the general salience for this purpose of an aggregated concept of ‘geoengineering’. 412 
However, the existence of a further two factors clearly indicates that the picture is not as simple as a 413 
description of a straightforward ‘pro’ /‘anti’ axis might suggest. With regard to the coherence or ambiguity of 414 
the term geoengineering, it appears that (although the most different in terms of their framing of 415 
geoengineering) individuals loading on Factor 2 (broadly in favour of geoengineering), and Factor 3 416 
(decidedly against geoengineering), actually appeared to find it less problematic making statements about 417 
geoengineering as a non-differentiated category, than those loading on Factors 1 and 4.  Thus for example, 418 
within the Factor 3 framing, a total ban on all geoengineering activities outside the laboratory is a necessary 419 
and coherent thing to call for [25].  Likewise within the Factor 2 framing, geoengineering (in general) is one 420 
of the most revolutionary new ideas in climate policy [14]. Interview data collected at the time of the Q sorts 421 
can be instructive in understanding this.  Thus a participant whose sort correlated with Factor 2 explained 422 
why he considered the term geoengineering to be useful: 423 
‘The term has proven to be very useful because of the discussions it catalyses.  I view the real utility 424 
of geoengineering not really as being the technological interventions but as being so extreme as a 425 
concept that it actually provokes imagination and the ability to open up discussions that are 426 
otherwise mired in more detailed political positions…it opens up new opportunities for reframing 427 
how we deal with climate…’  428 
On the other hand the following quote from a participant whose sort correlated with Factor 3 illustrates why 429 
he feels it is meaningful to object to geoengineering in general, and why disaggregating the term is not 430 
considered to be of primary importance: 431 
‘I just think there's a broader thing afoot about trying to solve problems through technological 432 
solutions rather than the heavy lifting of social change and actually addressing the root causes and 433 
so forth, and geoengineering in some way I think is totemic for that… it’s not just about a 434 
geoengineering solution, it kind of speaks to, we're going to have a technological solution for this, 435 
whether its carbon capture and storage or biofuels or air capture or nuclear power, whatever it is, 436 
we're going to craft a technological way round this, such that we don't have to significantly disrupt 437 
the economy…’ 438 
But while this participant appears to be able to object to geoengineering as illustrative of a broader (in his 439 
view) problematic attitude towards the application of technology to social and environmental problem 440 
solving,  participants loading on Factor 1 (supporting more research), appeared much less willing to take 441 
such a general or abstract stand.  A fairly typical quote from a participant loading on Factor 1 illustrates this: 442 
‘My reaction to the term is that it isn’t particularly helpful because it describes different groups of 443 
approaches. So there’s negative emissions, taking carbon out of the air, carbon dioxide removal I 444 
guess it’s called… which is a very different set of interventions than the solar radiation management 445 
stuff.  So geoengineering is a catch-all term that creates challenges for us to then have a clear 446 
position on… and within those there’s lots of different approaches which each have their pros and 447 
cons and different risk profile. 448 
Another commented: 449 
‘I don't want to have a debate about the terminology too much, I think I want to have a debate 450 
more about what the technologies do to our climate and I don't think having huge arguments about 451 
what a term is or not really make much difference to that’. 452 
Interestingly, although the Factor 1 perspective appears to find the ‘catch all’ nature of the term presents a 453 
problem for the making of general statements about geoengineering, and prefers to focus attention on 454 
individual technologies, this view is very clear about what geoengineering is not. Hence it appears from the 455 
negative score awarded to statement 18, that the definition of geoengineering (while encompassing a broad 456 
range of technologies) does not include those activities the effects of which were inadvertent.  457 
A different perspective still was offered by Factor 4, whose agreement with statement 18, suggest a 458 
distinctive take on the issue of intent, and a broader understanding of what might constitute geoengineering.  459 
For example, one Factor 4 participant defined the term to include interventions not generally classed as 460 
technological, such as the implementation of a carbon tax:  461 
‘If you capture carbon from smokestacks in coal plants, or you implement a carbon tax, or you put 462 
particulates in the stratosphere, those are all examples of geoengineering.’ 463 
While subscribing to a very broad definition of the term itself (to the extent that it might be difficult to 464 
differentiate from other categories of effort such as mitigation), Factor 4 participants (focusing on carbon) 465 
were also conscious of the possible utility of the term itself as offering something distinctive on the 466 
discursive level at least.  Hence one participant argued against the so-called ‘moral hazard’ argument against 467 
geoengineering research [36], by referred to the fact that arguments against geoengineering such as this act 468 
to prematurely close down ‘the solution space, the option space that you want to keep open.’ 469 
While the term’s ambiguity is clear, it might be said to have ‘functional malleability’ (Gledhill, 1994 p 216), 470 
and there appears to be a sense (particularly expressed by Factor 2 participants – supporting ‘planetary 471 
maintenance’) that the term in all its ambiguity might be politically useful in terms of acting as a catalyst for 472 
certain kinds of discussions.  Ironically the primary discourse of opposition as represented by Factor 3, in its 473 
view of geoengineering as emblematic of the fundamentally flawed nature of the global neo-liberal political 474 
economy, might actually act to breathe life into it.  Within the Factor 1 (‘pro research’) framing, the desire to 475 
disaggregate the term might be read as an opposition to the constraints of the term, or as an example of 476 
boundary work aimed at reducing ambiguity; while the broad definition of geoengineering offered by Factor 477 
4 (‘focus on carbon’) participants could be read as a different type of boundary work actually aimed at 478 
increasing the ambiguity of the term.   479 
Scholte et al (2012) argue that ‘ambivalence’ about geoengineering is a frame in and of itself (characterised 480 
by the presentation of arguments for and against geoengineering within one text), and they suggest that the 481 
increasing prevalence of their supposedly unitary ‘ambivalence frame’ above other framings of 482 
geoengineering articles in newspapers, provides hope for increasing reflexivity in the debate.  As discussed 483 
earlier, we concur that multivalence is a characteristic of the discourse as a whole, as indicated by the co-484 
existence of multiple divergent normative positions within the debate. However, crucial to this multiplicity is 485 
that axes of differentiation extend beyond a simple ‘pro’ versus ‘anti’ bimodality suggested by the term 486 
‘ambivalence’. Also counter to the argument made by Scholte et al, even if only twofold, such multiplicity 487 
cannot confidently be understood as a singular way of framing geoengineering in and of itself.  The relatively 488 
high number of so-called ‘confounders’ (individuals whose Q sorts correlated with more than one frame), 489 
that emerged from the analysis presented here, could be interpreted as revealing different forms of 490 
multivalence with respect to these framings.  However, multivalence with respect to the framings described 491 
here need not correspond to an individual being ambivalent about geoengineering per se. Obviously, this 492 
may be the case in some instances. But a more cautiously grounded interpretation is that the existence of 493 
these multivalences suggests a degree of instability in the present discourse. In this sense, the meanings 494 
attributed to geoengineering overall may still in some important senses be quite negotiable. But this does 495 
not mean that the resulting individual political positions taken in respect of particular prospective 496 
geoengineering initiatives may be not reasonably be unambiguous.  497 
The existence of the framing exemplified by Factor 4 (‘focus on carbon’) also problematizes the frequent 498 
calls for increasing precision around the term geoengineering as a pre-requisite for effective governance 499 
discussion. This is because it highlights how no one framework for partitioning of the term geoengineering 500 
into sub-categories can in itself be thought of as final. The most commonly used distinction - for instance 501 
that between carbon dioxide removal and solar radiation management – only makes sense from within 502 
particular frames. More specific distinctions at the level of ‘individual’ technologies are correspondingly 503 
more brittle in relation to contrasting ways of partitioning and aggregating multidimensional characteristics. 504 
The more “precise” the proposed taxonomy (like that defined under factor 4), the more vulnerable it is to 505 
alternative reasonable characterisations and prioritisations of discriminatory criteria.  So any one form of 506 
precision may reduce particular ambiguities, but leave others unaddressed – or even compound them. Calls 507 
for greater precision must therefore be interrogated as to particular axes of precision involved and their 508 
implications. And it cannot be assumed that precision is self-evident, or will in and of itself remedy either 509 
ambiguity or multivalence.  510 
 511 
4.1 Axes of difference 512 
Hulme (2008) argues that the prospective routes held out to us for dealing with climate change all have 513 
‘connotations of global control and mastery of the climatic future’ (p. 12). This observation is also borne out 514 
in the framings that emerge in this study, in which various ideas around the issue of ‘control’ constitute one 515 
of the principal axes of difference between the framings.  Unsurprisingly perhaps, the starkest contrast is 516 
between the polarised views of factors 2 and 3, although interestingly notions of control are arguably central 517 
to both. Factor 2 affirms the notion that ‘we can and should control the climate’, Factor 3 upholds the idea 518 
that ‘we can and should control the research.’ Salient here is the Factor 2 framing of geoengineering as 519 
‘planetary maintenance engineering’ [6], and its emphasis on the human ability to create complex control 520 
systems [30], building on an ever increasing scientific sophistication allowing greater understanding of 521 
complexity [17].  Conversely the Factor 3 framing emphasizes what is perceived to be the self-deception of 522 
attempts to control nature [1, 15], the irreducible complexity and chaos of the climate system [17], and 523 
human fallibility and social intractability in attempting to create complex control systems in the past [30].  524 
The roles are reversed when the focus becomes control of research and other geoengineering activities, with 525 
the Factor 2 framing emphasizing what is felt to be the ‘counterproductive’ nature of attempts to ban 526 
geoengineering, and the inappropriateness of a moratorium on geoengineering [25], which might result in 527 
testing being carried out in secrecy [34]. The Factor 3 framing, on the other hand, emphasizes the perceived 528 
necessity of strong controls on research.  With regard to the degree to which this control of research is 529 
believed to be possible, one participant commented: 530 
‘It may be true that it’s not fully enforceable but it has very powerful norm setting… it’s very 531 
important to set that as the standard.’ 532 
While rejecting the ‘planetary maintenance’ metaphor, the Factor 1 and 4 framings diverge somewhat in 533 
their view of the feasibility of achieving climate control, with more reticence being expressed within the 534 
Factor 4 framing, about the possibilities for either knowledge of complexity [17], and control of the climate 535 
[30]. 536 
The concept of research represents another fault line or tension between the framings.  Given that much 537 
discussion of geoengineering occurs in academic journals, and much of the discussion is about research of 538 
various types and disciplines, Geoengineering is thus framed by many as being ‘at the research stage’, and in 539 
particular Factor 1 participants appeared to adhere to this view.  Thus for example, a fairly typical Factor 1 540 
viewpoint was expressed thus: 541 
‘I would be paranoid and scared of anybody saying we're going to start geoengineering tomorrow, 542 
but I'd be just as worried about someone saying we're going to outlaw any research on 543 
geoengineering.  We need to do this research. Whether or not we actually do anything with the 544 
research is another matter. But in case we need to geoengineer, we should do the research now. 545 
Because when you're doing it in a panic and you think you've only got 20 years before London is 546 
underwater, you're not going to do science as well as when you think we might not need to do this, 547 
you can actually sit back and concentrate and take a slightly longer term view of it’.   548 
 549 
A positive emphasis on research is broadly shared by Factors 1, 2 and 4, as illustrated by factor scores for 550 
statements 3, 12, and 33, but is problematized by Factor 3 in particular, and to a lesser extent Factor 4 551 
(statements 16 and 37).  Thus a Factor 3 participant commented about research: 552 
‘[research] creates a dynamic where you're moving towards something, it creates the beginnings of 553 
almost an industry of people who have invested in all of that.’  554 
 555 
And the same participant was keen to unpick the term, asking ‘what’s hidden in the term research?’ and 556 
commenting: 557 
‘I think it’s very deliberate, the term [research] gets kept together, and by being kept together it 558 
means that people who actually don't ever want to move to some kind of experimentation should 559 
nonetheless feel they have to support that statement [3] … it speaks to scientific freedom and all 560 
these kind of things, which of course and if you’re in academia are deeply important and rightly so, 561 
but I think it’s a deliberate strategy to keep that language obscure’. 562 
 563 
The way in which geoengineering is framed (particularly but not exclusively by Factor 1 participants) as being 564 
at the research stage, also feeds into ideas about the degree to which geoengineering represents something 565 
fundamentally new and untried, or is a continuation (or the latest manifestation of) practices and ideas with 566 
a long history.  Of the four framings uncovered by this study, the emphasis on continuity is most apparent 567 
within the Factor 3 and 4 framings, while as outlined above, Factors 1 and 2 appear to emphasize research 568 
and novelty.  For example, Factor 3 was distinctive among the four factors in assigning neither a positive nor 569 
negative ranking to statement 7 (that deliberate geoengineering has been happening for decades and was 570 
not all about dealing with climate change).  Interview data and comments from participants who loaded on 571 
Factor 3 point to a division over exactly what this means.  One view was characterised by the following 572 
comments: 573 
‘Geoengineering technologies patented decades ago have been and are being used covertly as 574 
political/economic/military weapons. This is obvious to anyone who studies the sky and knows the 575 
history of weather/climate modification development. Look up!’W 576 
 577 
Although not all Factor 3 participants shared this view, the issue of continuity with other technologies and 578 
the idea that the issue was broader than the current climate change focus might suggest were shared.  579 
Hence another Factor 3 participant commented: 580 
‘I do think there’s other interests in geoengineering other than climate change, particularly 581 
commercial interests. I think there’s an attempt to create new markets in the longer term, there is 582 
military interest… I don’t think they’ve been spraying but I do think it’s not all about climate change.’  583 
 584 
The distinction between geoengineering, weather modification and so-called ‘chemtrails’ theories is worthy 585 
of a brief note at this point.  As a subject discussed and debated by governments, think-tanks and academics, 586 
geoengineering in all its ambiguity and multivalence appears to have acquired widespread credibility as a 587 
‘serious’ (Keith & Dowlatabadi 1992) scientific subject.  Weather modification on the other hand, has a 588 
relatively less authoritative status, occasionally presented as a ‘pseudo-science’, associated with an array of 589 
more or less credible characters driven by a variety of more or less honourable intentions (Fleming 2006).  590 
Finally, the ‘chemtrail’ theory (positing the existence of a global network of weather modification for 591 
nefarious ends), lacks general credibility and authority and is widely labelled (dismissively) in the literature as 592 
a conspiracy theory (e.g. Brewer 2007). However, as this examination of the multiple framings of 593 
geoengineering has revealed, the boundaries around terms and activities are by no means clear cut or un-594 
ambiguous, and on-going boundary work (Gieryn 1983) is required to maintain the distinction between 595 
terms in such ways as to maintain the epistemic authority of certain actors.   596 
 597 
Interview comments from a participant associated with Factor 4 reveal a view that is more explicit about the 598 
fluid and blurred nature of the boundaries between different activities: 599 
‘We’re already geoengineering the climate … I mean we do a lot to try and change the climate 600 
system, we dam rivers, we irrigate large parts of farmland that changes the local climate, we 601 
deforest.  In the western US I think there’s 169 weather modification projects that try to improve 602 
rainfall, China does it systematically…’ 603 
 604 
And when questioned further about the distinctiveness of weather modification from geoengineering, the 605 
same participant highlighted the continuum between them and the constructed character of notions of 606 
‘climate’, by commenting:  607 
‘Weather is events and climate is statistics…’ 608 
 609 
The distinction between weather modification and geoengineering is also brought into question by the 610 
following comment made by a Factor 1 participant: 611 
 612 
‘[The Chinese] are raising from 70 million to 500 million a year the amount they’re spending on their 613 
weather modification program, and once you get to half a billion dollars a year, you’re actually 614 
talking about something that on aggregate could have a significant effect.. Assume it’s effective, 615 
you’re now at a stage where you’re modifying local weather sufficiently over a long enough period 616 
that it’s kind of like a geoengineering intervention […] I think we’re going to back-step into 617 
geoengineering in that way.’CGG 618 
 619 
The emphasis on novelty or continuity in different framings of geoengineering is intimately connected to 620 
different framings of the interests and motivations at play, and this is another axis of difference along which 621 
the framings uncovered by this study can be seen to diverge.   Again, Factors 3 and 4 are united by a shared 622 
framing of the potential for non-climate change related application of geoengineering technologies, 623 
including military applications. 624 
But beyond more radical uses of geoengineering technologies for purposes other than combating climate 625 
change, a key distinguishing characteristic of the Factor 3 perspective is that geoengineering – both the 626 
technologies it comprises and the attitude it is understood to represent – is an explicitly political project.  627 
Here, the process of framing of the issue is understood to be a key element of that project.  As one 628 
participant explained: 629 
‘On the pro-geoengineering side I think there is a small core of ideologically motivated and politically 630 
smart and active people who are moving people intentionally, particularly in the whole framing 631 
game in very careful ways … while there is a lot of naivety and good intention throughout the 632 
discussion there’s also some very active interests…  I can see some evidence of that. That sounds 633 
conspiratorial, it’s not … it’s just looking at the political economy of discussions around climate 634 
change’. 635 
Finally, various authors have noted the use of a real or hypothetical climate emergency as a powerful 636 
framing device within which geoengineering interventions are situated, and similarly the existence of a 637 
climate emergency was an important element of one of the framings (Factor 2) that emerged from this study.  638 
The following comment typifies this element of the framing: 639 
‘The risks from the climate are infinitely worse than the risks from geoengineering; I mean that’s 640 
absolutely obvious.  I say infinitely because that means the end of everything, end of civilisation 641 
possibly all human life, I mean it’s as serious as that […] Long term it’s a catastrophe. 642 
However, although interviews reveal that the urgency of the climate predicament is clearly important for 643 
many people, it appears that the framing of the issue in terms of emergency is being consciously rejected by 644 
all but Factor 2 participants [statement 48]. For example, one Factor 1 participant commented:  ‘I think the 645 
whole idea of a climate emergency is really kind of counter-productive.’ Another hinted at a more strategic 646 
view of framing by commenting that it was not a question of whether emergency was a reality or not, but 647 
whether or not the emergency frame was helpful for achieving particular ends: 648 
‘I think people are consciously stepping away from [the emergency framing] because it’s become 649 
clear that different ideas about what emergency means makes the term useless… It’s difficult to use 650 
emergency to promote particular actions.’ 651 
However, although emergency was rejected as a valid framing of the issue by participants that loaded on 652 
Factors 1 and 4, the idea of a hypothetical future emergency still featured within these views as a rationale 653 
for research [statement 19]. Participants loading on Factor 3 rejected any emergency rationale (either 654 
present or future) for geoengineering. One Factor 3 participant explained why he considered the climate 655 
emergency framing to be problematic: 656 
 ‘The dangerous thing to do with geoengineering, is to frame it … only to be a climate discussion, 657 
because if you do then it becomes this uni-dimensional, you know, climate change has got terribly 658 
bad, we need to have a fix for it, everything gets arbitrated within this very narrow climate thing, but 659 
what you’re changing is the planet, or you know, large parts of it, which are much more than about 660 
climate, climate is just one factor.’ 661 
 662 
4.2 Significant silences 663 
It is worth noting that a number of people involved with critical environmental NGO’s, who were invited to 664 
take part in this study did not respond to invitations to participate, and hence it is likely that there may be a 665 
number of significant silences or gaps in the research presented.  The reasons for individuals’ reticence 666 
about involvement (whether about the subject matter, this particular study, or the Geoengineering 667 
Governance Project more broadly) were not specified and thus can only be the subject of conjecture.  668 
However, Walker and Shove point out that involvement of a broad range of stakeholders in participatory 669 
projects and processes, can raise a number of issues, with the potential for inclusion to be ‘re-interpreted as 670 
a process of co-option and neutering of dissent, producing deeply problematic tensions for those taking part’ 671 
(Walker & Shrove 2007, p.221). Indeed the issue of co-option was one that was raised explicitly by a Factor 3 672 
participant, who argued that much of the discussion around geoengineering was being manipulated by 673 
people interested in slowing down and confusing governance of climate change; and that hence even being 674 
drawn into these discussions would be to play into the hands of these interests.  He commented: 675 
‘There are a lot of well-intentioned people, who are caught up in the discussion and I think to some 676 
extent are being used, and some of them are letting themselves be used...’ 677 
If then, one views the conversation itself as a massive distraction from existing governance discussions 678 
around climate change, then perhaps silence and non-participation in that conversation, as embodied by 679 
refusals to participate in just such processes and projects as this one, can be read both as an effective and 680 
reasonable form of dissent (c.f. Whelan & Lyons 2005). It may be significant here, that this study was 681 
completed prior to the much remarked-upon (Stilgoe 2013; Cressey 2013) mention of climate 682 
geoengineering at the end of the most recent IPCC summary report for policymakers (IPCC 2013). 683 
 684 
5 Conclusion 685 
Fischer and Hajer (1999, p.2) argued that although conceptually weak, the term ‘sustainable development’ 686 
created a generative metaphor or story-line around which different interests could co-ordinate, and thus 687 
proved to be a very functional concept (cf. Stirling 2009). Arguably the same might be said of the term 688 
‘geoengineering’ (albeit on a smaller, subordinate and more idiosyncratic canvas). As this study has 689 
illustrated, geoengineering has a fluid, ambiguous and multivalent set of meanings and is framed by different 690 
actors in a variety of ways. Interestingly (and unlike ‘Sustainability’), the convening power of the term seems 691 
equally potent in two opposing directions, for and against the idea of climate geoengineering in general. This 692 
evident polarity within the debate as revealed by the existence of Factors 2 and 3, appears to indicate a 693 
‘framing gulf’ across which actors are likely to ‘talk past one another’ rather than engage meaningfully (c.f. 694 
Hoffman 2011).   695 
However, it is also the case that the existence of additional framings not defined purely along this axis of ‘pro’ 696 
/ ‘anti’ difference suggests an emerging resistance among certain actors to the debate becoming polarised in 697 
this way.  These alternative framings appear to be seeking either to increase (in the case of Factor 4) or 698 
decrease (in the case of Factor 1) the ambiguity and multivalence of the term. Given the multiple framings 699 
and meanings within the term, this is unlikely ever to be fully realizable.  Unlike the picture suggested by 700 
Scholte et al. (2013), who suggest that what they call ‘the ambivalence frame may prove to be less powerful 701 
than other frames that evoke strong positive or negative feelings’, our findings suggest that ambivalence is 702 
not best seen as a frame in and of itself able to garner or lose support. Encompassing both multi-703 
dimensionally contending, as well as individually unclear, meanings, this indeterminacy is likely to remain a 704 
fundamental, pervasive and perhaps unavoidable feature of the discursive landscape of geoengineering. 705 
Interviews have highlighted the diversity of actors broadly subscribing to shared framings of geoengineering. 706 
This might suggest the coming into existence around the term of various discourse coalitions (Fischer & 707 
Forester 1993), linking otherwise disparate actors and networks through certain shared narratives and the 708 
utilisation of certain discursive resources. Possible examples here are: (i) the narrative of the neutrality or 709 
normative desirability of ‘research’ linking disparate groups within Factor 1; or (ii) the narrative of the 710 
essentially undemocratic nature of aspirations to engineer climate at the planetary scale, which links groups 711 
within Factor 3.  It is clear here that the interpretative flexibility opened up by the ambiguous and 712 
multivalent nature of the term facilitates this coalition-formation process by allowing individuals with 713 
perhaps little in common in other respects, to speak the same language or advance shared interests on a 714 
particular issue.  The development of other issues in environmental politics illuminates a clear danger here 715 
of co-option of certain actors by others – strategically utilizing particular framing devices to garner support 716 
for a particular view.    717 
It remains the case in climate geoengineering as elsewhere, that there may exist significant gaps in any 718 
picture that can be presented of the governance discourse. Where discourse itself is recognised to display 719 
potentially potent path-dependencies it becomes clear that such silences may indicate not indifference or 720 
acquiescence, but strongly held commitments and active strategy. Experience in other areas of controversy 721 
suggests it would be as wise to avoid dismissing these silences as over-interpreting them. Where a discourse 722 
itself is seen as dangerously self-reinforcing, it seems as reasonable to defend a right to remain silent, as to 723 
voice a critical view. But there does appear one general practical implication for geoengineering governance 724 
that is consistent with all the perspectives resolved here. This is, that the natures and implications of 725 
contrasting forms of climate geoengineering – and of ideas of geoengineering in general – are matters that 726 
far transcend technical analysis alone. Each of the broad perspectives resolved here, entails radically 727 
divergent implications for what would count as appropriate questions, expertise or analysis. Compounded 728 
(rather than diminished) by the gravity and urgency of the climate change challenge, then, the obvious 729 
response to such dilemmas is an aspiration to some kind of democracy (Macnaghten & Szerszynski 2013). 730 
Equally by provocation and reflection, techniques like Q method may assist in helping to open up more 731 
robustly – and multivalently – critical debate. 732 
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